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As the focus of United States social welfare policy regarding
lone or single parent families has shifted to time-limited benefits,
no federal statutory entitlement,1 and an assumed permanent
transition into wage work, poverty academics, policymakers, and
activists have increasingly understood the centrality of the
connections between social welfare policy and low-wage labor in
the U.S. However, they have focused less on the connection
between these two fields and the areas of immigration (mobility of
humans) and globalization (mobility of capital). As a result,
persons working in the cause of redistribution of income have
often operated in analytical/theoretical vacuums, resulting in less
than fully sophisticated political analyses and missed opportunities
to develop effective poverty policy. The work I present here is an
attempt to provide some background information that I hope can
set the stage for a more knowledgeable interchange among social
welfare, low-wage work, immigration and globalization discourses,
and begin to draw threads amongthese fields, particularly focusing
on U.S. policies and ways in which they connect to Mexico.
a. Professor of Law, Northeastern University (B.A., Baylor University 1969,
J.D., University of Chicago 1974); was attorney for 12 years specializing in
employment and governmental benefits with the Massachusetts Law Reform
Institute; appointed in 1994 by President Clinton to the Advisory Council on
Unemployment Compensation.
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Initially, I explore two historical contexts: long-standing labor
and immigration ties between the U.S. and Mexico, and the
creation of a false dichotomy within the United States of those in
wage work and single parent families receiving social assistance
benefits. I then focus on recent changes in U.S. social welfare
policy toward U.S. single mothers and children and legal
immigrants, the largest number of whom are from Mexico, and
attempt to provide a rationale for undermining the articulated
tension or conflict between these two groups for low-wage jobs.
By exposing the artificiality of national borders vis-A-vis nationality
and electoral voice, I pose the question of redistribution as acrossborder issue. Ultimately, my hope is that by bringing together
seemingly disparate legal areas, scholars and activists can produce
a more nuanced and comprehensive poverty strategy.
A Brief Historical Overview of
Mexican/U.S.
Labor Interaction

Most people do not realize that the Mexican/U.S. border was
largely open until 1965. There were no immigration quotas based
on nationality as there were for most other countries, but there
were certain categories of people who were excluded from
admission to the U.S., such as prostitutes, and interestingly enough
ucontract laborers." 2 However, this last exception was often
honored in the breach.
Beginning during World War II, the Mexican/U.S.
governments implemented a"guest-worker" program, the Bracero
Program, under which Mexican men were transported into the
U.S. to do agricultural or field work in often deplorable
conditions.3 The United States unilaterallyterminated this program
in 1964, in part because of U.S. union opposition (the United
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Farm Workers under Caesar Chavez was organizing in California
beginning in the early 1960s, and Bracero workers were often
brought in to undermine strikes since they would be deported if
they resisted crossing picket lines) and because of increased
mechanization. Although officially defunct, the Bracero Program
laid the groundwork that influenced geographical patterns of
undocumented immigration throughout the past 30 years.
One year later, in 1965, partially in response to the Mexican
governments statements of their reliance on the Bracero Program
for job creation, the U.S. initiated the Mexican Border
Industrialization Program, or Maquila program. This created a 20
kilometer strip in Mexico along the Mexican/U.S. border to which
U.S. firms could import finished, ready-to-assemble components
and raw materials and hire low-wage Mexicans to assemble the
finished products. As long as the finished products were reexported to the U.S., the firmswere not subject to Mexican import
restrictions or duties and only paid a U.S. tariff on the value added
by the assembly in Mexico. The program expanded rapidly, hiring
a different population than that employed under the Bracero
Program-young single women. 4
That same year Congress enacted immigration quotas for the
Western Hemisphere for the first time under the 1965
Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. 5 While
individual countries had no limits on the number of visas that
would be granted, the law established an overall ceiling of
120,000 visas per year for the entire Western Hemisphere.
Thus long before the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) 6 was ratified in 1994 and cuts in social welfare programs
for legal immigrants were enacted in 1996, the two countries had
strong labor market ties, albeit largely driven by U.S. corporate
interests. For many years, there had been mobility of labor from
Mexico to the U.S., which had an impact on low-wage workers in
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both countries.7 It is within this historical context that the NAFTA
and U.S. immigration policy was and continues to be debated.
Traditional U.S. Social Welfare
for Poor Single Mothers
U.S. social welfare policy, set againstthe backdrop of a rugged
individualism concept, has always reflected an ambivalence about
poverty, with certain groups (for example, those defined as wage
earners) carved out for special treatment As part of the Social
SecurityAct enacted in 1935,8 both Unemployment Insurance (UI)
and a program called Aid to Dependent Children, later Aid to
Families With DependentChildren (AFDC), were established. The
former was an acknowledgment that the U.S. was not a fullemployment society, and that there would always be both
frictional and structural unemployment; the latter was designed to
provide an amount less than subsistence for the children of single
parents (predominantly women) and later, the single parents
themselves.'
However, the two programs were always viewed very
differently: UI was "worthy" because itwas tied to wage labor, and
AFDC was "the dole" because it was not tied to wage work, but to
parenting. This bifurcation of social programs allowed society to
construct a false dichotomy between wage workers and welfare
recipients. People who advocated for higher wages, better labor
standards, and more expansive unemployment insurance benefits
as a social safety net routinely distanced themselves from programs
like AFDC, need-based schemes for which eligibility was not
directly connected to wage work.
Only in the last decade have empirical studies documented
the fluidity between the population of low wage workers and
women receiving welfare. These studies have shown that a vast
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percentage of women receiving welfare move in and out of wage
work on a regular basis.1" When they moved in and out of wage
labor, however, they were ineligible for the "worthy"
Unemployment Insurance Program because the legal definition of
"worker" orthe legal eligibility factors in unemployment insurance
excluded them from the definition of "employees."" Thus they
returned to AFDC as their "unemployment insurance" and were
perceived as shiftless "non-workers."
Recent Shift in
U.S. Social Welfare Policy
vis-A-vis
Low-Wage Labor and Immigrants
This brief history sets the critical context in which to
understand the recent dismantling of social protection in the
United States. In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)' - rescinded the AFDC
program, and instead created Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (rANF). Rather than providing social protection for single
mothers and their children as a federal statutory entitlement, the
new program gives each state a "block grant" In other words,
each state receives a fixed allocation of money to distribute largely
at its own discretion. 3
Although there are few federal mandates in the new statute,
two are central to the rhetoric of the new policy: 1) parents can
only receive TANF for a maximum of five years in their lifetime,
and 2) at certain points in time, states must have a fixed
percentage of recipients in wage work and/or "workfare" (that is,
working off their TANF grant). Thus the focus moves away from
income supportfor poorwomen and children, and onto shortterm
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receipt of social welfare benefits with an assumed permanent
transition into wage work.
As of December 1998, the welfare, or TANF, national
caseload had dropped by 40% since the PRWORA had passed,
with very little follow-up or explanation.14 There were 1,845,000
fewer families and 5,264,000 fewer recipients on the welfare
rolls.1 Thus almost two million single parents, mostly women,
manywith little education and skill level,16are relying on low-wage
labor or some source of income other than TANF. Of the 2.8
million families still on the rolls, 7 many will reach the mandatory
2-5 year time limit within the next few years and be terminated
regardless of whether they had any reasonable opportunity to
obtain paid labor or have any other source of income. Many poor
mothers inthe United States who had previously moved inand out
of low-wage work, with AFDC functioning as their "unemployment
insurance," can no longer do this due to the TANF time limits.
They no longer have either AFDC or UI as a social safety net; thus
many of them will be in a position in which they will have to
accept paid labor with whatever conditions and wages they can
get. If they cannot find paid labor, being ineligible for further
public assistance, they will be left entirely dependent on private
charity for survival.
It is unclear whether paid labor markets can absorb those
terminated from public assistance. Some studies question whether
low-wage labor markets can incorporate the numbers who are
being dropped from the welfare rolls. And, of course, the
geographical impact is disparate, since the areas with a higher
number of welfare recipients do not necessary correspond with the
areas of high job growth. For example, between 1992 and 1996,
as the United States' economy moved out of recession, New York
City experienced a net gain of 88,000 jobs. If this rate of growth
continued and every new job were given to a New York City
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welfare recipient, it would take 21 years for all 470,000 adults on
welfare in New York City to gain employment.'Other estimates indicate that the economy can create the
number of jobs needed, not on short notice, but only over the
long-term.' 9 But even if the economy can absorb these workers
over the long-term, studies estimate that this huge influx of largely
unskilled workers would depress wages, benefits, and working
conditions. The Economic Policy Institute has estimated that by
moving nearly one million welfare recipients into the labor force,
the end of an entitlement to social protection for this population
will initiate an 11-12% decline in real wages, but only for the
bottom 1/3 of the work force.2"
Studies are also beginning to assess the likely impact on
currently employed workers of the full and partial job
displacement that will be caused by workfare requirements. A
recent study focusing on New York City found that the likely result
of placing 30,000 workfare participants in publicsectorslotswould
be to displace 20,000 other workers and reduce wages for the
bottom 1/3 of entire New York City workforce (publicand private)
by 9%.21 It is not inconsequential that most of those who will be
displaced are unionized.
At the same time as the United States was rescinding its
communal commitment to income support for single parent
families, social protection law was also altering the inclusion and
identity of immigrants. The PRWORA rescinded eligibility of legal
immigrants, including low-wage workers, for virtually all social
welfare programs designed to assist the poor, including TANF,
Food Stamps and Social Security Insurance (a program for aged
and disabled individuals who do not have a sufficient tie to wage
work to qualify for regular Social Security benefits).22' While some
of the social protection benefits have been restored, the
restorations are almost exclusively for immigrants who were in the
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United States at the time the PRWORA passed in August 1996.23
So the huge influx of legal immigrants who enter the country each
year after 1996 are still ineligible for the majority of social
protection programs which are not connected to high wages or
long-term labor-market participation.24
The connection between these immigrant provisions of the
PRWORA and NAFTA is critical to a cross-border poverty analysis.
It should not go unnoticed that Mexicans are by far the largest
group of United States' legal immigrants who have chosen not to
naturalize as United States citizens. 25 Indeed, in spite of the long
Mexico-United States history of border exchange and guest worker
programs, there has also been a societal perception that Mexicans
did not have to assimilate because they were in the United States
only as "temporary workers."
Two years prior to the passage of the PRWORA, the U.S.
Congress had ratified NAFTA over the adamant opposition of
virtually all U.S. labor unions. One bone that the U.S. government
threw to labor was the NAFTA-Trade Adjustment Act2 6 which
provided additional weeks of unemployment benefits and money
for retraining those "workers" who lost their jobs because of
increased imports or plants moving to other countries (that is,
Mexico) as a result of NAFTA. The result of these complex and
often isolated legal revisions is that U.S. taxpayers are funding both
the extended unemployment benefits and the retraining of
"workers" (as defined by unemployment insurance) dislocated by
U.S. trade policy, at the same time as they are defunding many
social welfare benefits to low wage female workers (who are
ineligible for unemployment insurance) and low income, legal,
often Mexican, immigrants.
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Interaction Between TANF Recipients

and Mexican Immigrants in Low-Wage Labor
These factors highlight a major tension between the
expectation that the U.S. low-wage labor force can and must
absorb all welfare recipients, and the understanding of the close
connection of the U.S. with Mexican immigrants because of prior
"guest worker" programs, proximity, economic disparity, large
common border and numbers of Mexicans already in the U.S. In
particular, many in the U.S. labor movement and many left and
progressive academics and advocates have taken an antiimmigration position because of an assumption that immigration
reduces the power of particularly unskilled low-wage U.S. workers
to negotiate higher wages and better working conditions.
Although studies on the impact of immigrants on the U.S.
economy and labor conditions reach widely divergent conclusions,
often finding positive economic effects and no negative effect on
wages and labor conditions, the claim that immigration of unskilled
workers reduces wages and conditions is still frequently touted.27
Immigrants and prior TANF recipients are already being pitted
against one another. For example, a U.S. General Accounting
Office study found no need for an immigrant guest farmworker
program in part because welfare recipients affected by either the
time limits or the work requirements of the PROWRA will provide
a surplus supply. 28 When the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization

Service deported undocumented Mexican field workers, growers
were encouraged to hire welfare recipients.219 Of course, field
work is seasonal, so workers are laid off for 4-6 months at a stretch
with no social protection benefits. And although some social
workers and growers note that field work schedules vary
depending on the weather and condition of the crop and that
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standard daytime child care is not always adequate, the U.S.
Department of Labor takes the position that the child care needs
infarm occupations are no different than that inother industries."
A number of other factors make the relationship between
immigration policy, TANF, and low-wage labor even more
complex. Often policymakers, scholars, and activists across
political persuasions have ignored the fact that, fcr certain
industries, capital is much more mobile across borders than
humans, and that an anti-immigration policy which does not
provide asupply of low wage workers within our current economic
structure may result in migration of certain job-sites entirely and,
thus, even further diminution of U.S. labor conditions.
The reverse of this equation is reflected in an implicit
assumption when NAFTA was ratified that the flow of goods and
finances from Mexico to the U.S. would replace the flow of

people, an assumption which required a pervasive Economic
development/job creation program inMexico. However, working
at odds with such economic development in Mexico is the
reduction of agriculture subsidies-mandated by International
Monetary Fund macroeconomic structural adjustments -which
had benefitted both large and small scale farmers in rural areas.
The resulting agricultural crisis has resulted in both farm
foreclosures (with resulting dislocation) and reduced economic
activity in urban areas situated near prosperous agricultural areas.
In other words, human mobility and capital mobility are
inextricably intertwined.
In addition, activists and policymakers often operate from an
assumption that more restrictive immigration laws and
enforcement will stop or reduce immigration from Mexico, rather
than seeing the complexities of how changes in laws shape
immigration, but do not stop it. More restrictive immigration
produces more undocumented immigrants, a particularly
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vulnerable population who are more likely to accept jobs with the
lowest wages and poorest conditions, with a possible impact on
U.S. low-wage labor and ex-TANF recipients.
Finally, immigrant workers are not necessarily substitutes who
displace existing workers or increase labor supply to the point of
reduced wages and labor conditions. Rather a poverty/low-wage
policy could be envisioned which juxtaposed each group of
unskilled workers as complements. Under that analysis, one might
argue for a pro-education and training policy for TANF mothers to
move them into a position to complement rather than compete
with unskilled immigrants.3
The Political Fluidit,
of the Border
Both U.S. social protection reductions and political
democratization in Mexico may catapult Mexicans living in the
U.S. into a central position that further explodes the concept of
nation-state boundaries. In fact, the result of the welfare
disqualifications of legal immigrants may be exactly the opposite
of that intended by many of its proponents, who claim it reduces
the number of legal immigrants, or at least decreases the number
of legal immigrants on the public dole.
One major result of denying virtually all social assistance
programs to legal immigrants has been a startling surge in United
States naturalizations, particularly among Mexicans. The denial of
benefits to legal immigrants, alongwith other recent anti-immigrant
political actions, has resulted in a new consciousness among longterm legal Mexican immigrants that they must be a part of the
electorate by acquiring voting rights through naturalization as
United States citizens. Until 1994, the number of naturalizations
by Mexicans legally residing in the United States was fairly stable:
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there were 17,564 naturalizations in 1990, 22,066 in 1991,
12,880 in 1992, 23,630 in 1993. In 1994, the year that
Californians adopted "Proposition 187" (barring undocumented
immigrants from receiving publicly funded education and most
social services and health care, and directing local law
enforcement authorities, school administrators, social workers and
health-care aides to report suspected undocumented irmmigrants
and, in some cases, legal immigrants), the number of
naturalizations surged to 46,186, and in 1995 to 79,614. Most
dramatically in 1996 (the year the PRWORA was being debated
and enacted), Mexico was the leading country-of-birth of persons
32
naturalizing, with 254,988 or 24.4 % of total naturalizations.
Once they become United States citizens, Mexican-Americans
have greatly expanded legal rights to bring family members into the
United States. Thus, the ironic end result of these anti-immigrant
actions may be even greater numbers of Mexican immigrants in the
U.S. Questions arise about the effect of this potential influx of
family members of the newly naturalized on the low-wage labor
force, and the interplay between that population and the influx of
welfare recipients possibly competing for the same jobs.
In addition, in the last year Mexican laws relating to dual
citizenship and ability to vote in Mexican elections for Mexicans
living in other countries have dramatically changed. Mexican nonresidents are now allowed to maintain dual citizenship both in
Mexico and in the country of their residence.33 Most recently,
Mexico's Congress enacted legislation, not yet implemented,
which would allow non-resident Mexican citizens to vote in
Mexican elections. 34 Almost 10 million Mexicans residing in the
U.S. could be eligible to vote, including 7 million born in Mexico
and 2.6 million born of Mexican parents. 35 Such an expansion of
36
voters could create major shifts in Mexican politics.
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Thus the rampant increase in U.S. naturalizations and the
breaking open or democratization of Mexican political parties
could have broad-based implications for social protection and lowwage labor in both the U.S. and Mexico. The construction of dual
citizenship and dual voting privileges exposes the artificiality of
protectionism and fixed borders which seems entrenched in social
protection, low-wage labor, and immigration discourse.
Conclusion
These interrelationships and cross-border connections force
me to provide a critique of my own role, and perhaps
shortsightedness, as a welfare and employment law advocate. The
myriad of issues discussed above are not designed to yield a single
coherent poverty policy, but rather to challenge us to frame new
questions about poverty strategy within an increasingly globalized
economy:
Did the U.S. labor anti-NAFTA position, albeit inadvertently,
feed into a racist, anti-Mexican and anti-immigration policy, which
then fueled the anti-immigrant backlash in U.S. welfare policy?
If one effect of social welfare cuts to U.S. legal immigrants is
a surge in naturalizations with a subsequent increased flow of
family members migrating to the U.S., will this supply more lowwage, foreign-born workers and entice certain plants to remain in
the U.S.? How do these new immigrants correlate with those who
would have obtained jobs if plants had moved to Mexico?
Ifimmigration can expand or preserve certain industries in the
U.S., creating new jobs for complementary skill holders, should an
effective U.S. poverty policy focus on increasing human capital of
U.S. unskilled workers so that they might be able to take
advantage of those new jobs? Could or should U.S. progressives
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support such a policy with its implications for further constructing
and supporting racial hierarchies?
How do we begin to connect U.S. social welfare cuts and IMF
structural macroeconomic adjustment policies, and analyze their
impact on low-wage labor markets cross-border?
Finally and most fundamentally, how do we develop a crossborder poverty redistributive strategy? There isan ongoing tension
in poverty debate between improving or maintaining living
standards for low-wage workers and job creation for the
unemployed poor. While often discussed as a policy question
internal to a nation-state, the same issues should be raised more
often in cross-border poverty discourse. A nation may shift
between two situations; one where its citizenry faces such poverty
that it must protect their labor conditions through attempting to
restrict migration of humans, and another where its economy is
solid enough and its citizens' living conditions sufficiently adeq uate
that restrictive immigration may not be the priority. Can nations,
in a time of the breakdown of borders due to the mobility of
capital, coherently establish a line between these two positions?
If a nation-state sets up an astructure attempting to restrict human
mobility, will it ever reach a point of acknowledging that its
internal poverty/unemployment islow enough that the country can
focus on cross-border poverty? in short, can an effective poverty
policy ever be based on a protectionist position?
I do not have answers to these questions, and am not even
sure if I am asking the right questions. However, if we do not
struggle to develop the incredibly complex cross-disciplinary,
cross-border analysis of the interaction of low-wage labor,
globalization, social welfare policy and immigration, we are
missing an important opportunity to do redistributive work.
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